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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S REASONS FOR STRIKING THE ONLY MINORITY 
MEMBER OF THE VENIRE WERE NOT ADEQUATE TO SHOW A NON-
RACIAL BASIS FOR THE STRIKE. 
The State asserts that the prosecutor's justification for striking Lance Masina, the only 
racial minority member of the jury panel, was race-neutral and did not violate either defendant's 
or the juror's constitutional rights. Initially, the State argues that defendant only preserved this 
issue under a federal equal protection ground and that counsel's mention of violations of 
defendant's Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and corresponding clauses under the 
State Constitution was not adequate to preserve those claims. The State is wrong. Defendant 
was not required to use any "magic words" in order to preserve his constitutional claims. United 
States v. McCullah, 87 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 1996). Appellant specifically enunciated the 
constitutional provisions violated (RT 215). Those provisions cover fundamental fairness and 
the right to a trial by a fair cross section of the community and unbiased jury. The State's 
reliance on State v. Span to the contrary is misplaced since the defense counsel in that case 
mentioned only Batson error and made no reference to other provisions to the constitution, as did 
defendant in the instant case. (Brief of Appellee at 9, State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 337 n.4 (Utah 
1991)). 
Turning to the prosecutor's purported reason for excusing the only minority panel 
member, his reason was tainted by his statement that he did not think a Batson objection was 
appropriate because the defendant was not a minority but rather was Caucasian (RT 215). The 
court then stated, "Well, let's assume for the purposes of this discussion that he is entitled to 
1 
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claim the cloak of minority status given the circumstances." (RT 215: 11-14). The prosecutor 
then stated that the reason the minority panel member was stricken was his affirmative response 
that he knew people in jail (RT 215). However, prospective jurors Farnsworth and Graham also 
gave an affirmative response but were not challenged and were empaneled as jurors (RT 34, 41). 
(The State claims the prosecutor peremptorily struck two of the four jurors who responded they 
knew people in jail, citing Page 103 of the Record of Trial. There is no foundation for such a 
statement in the record. Mr. Masina was stricken. Two of the jurors made it on the panel. There 
is no indication that the other juror was challenged off the panel: She could simply have been in 
the group left behind the first eight jurors remaining after challenges.) 
The prosecutor's next reason for peremptorily challenging Mr. Masina was that he was 
young and single. Keeping in mind the prosecutor's expressed misunderstanding that because 
defendant was Caucasian he could not object to jurors being challenged on the basis of race, the 
very general fact that Mr. Masina was young and single does not vindicate the peremptory 
challenge. Over-balancing this excuse is the fact the prosecution challenged a disproportionate 
number of the minority membership from the panel. In other words, he challenged 100% of the 
minority representation from the panel with a peremptory challenge. 
With regard to Batson error, a defendant can establish in a prima facie showing a "strong 
likelihood" of race-based challenges by pointing out that the prosecutor struck most or all 
members of a minority group from the panel. People v. Crittenden 9 Cal.4th 83, 115, 885 P.2d 
887 (1994), citing Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and People v. Wheeler 22 Cal.3d 258, 
280-81, 583 P.2d 748 (1978). By virtue of this fact alone, the defense made a strong showing of 
discriminatory intent and the prosecutor's response that Mr. Masina was young and single was 
2 
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may be a race-neutral reason in theory but it is such a general reason that it cannot rebut a strong 
prima facie case arising out of 100% of all minority representation being peremptorily 
challei lged Note tl le pi ose ::i itic 1 11 levei said wl i/y I )eii is :»; y 01 n i g a:i id single woi ild soi i i = how 
impact on the person's ability to fulfill Mr. Masina's oath as a furor. 
1 i\c State now attempts to state thai .nice ^.juuiaii. :*is case was a young, single, 
incarcerated male the exclusion was justilio' < >! . n u w theie is no basis in !he u \ o .| !. 'lie 
State's assertion Miat the proserutoi diew thai iclaiionship between the defendant and the excused 
mei i lbei • : ' ; • _ . . \ ' = v • - , . ! • • . . - . . • voung and singi , : luanr ' is no 
general, applies to far too many members of the population and is too weak to rebut the strong 
showing of exclusion on the ba-:^ o f u i a 
II . MAi - , i i ll i , n>h i \ i I- l i ^MONSTRATES THAT T H E R E W AS N C • I 
SUF * i \ U)\ \( i TO SI PPORT JASON BIGGS ' CONVICTION 
The State argues thai tin", was not a rase in\ .-h i:ig insufficient evidence but w jb mere!} .» 
casei i -Ainei u i'Mcsses the jtiiA ehose to hehe\e ! K Stale s argument is incorrect Fven 
setting aside whether the defense witnesses were belu \ ahU > \--L n.--.d .h ' =mline 
that the prosecution evidence on the issue of identification could support a coin ictioi *i 
defendant 1 1 le c I lb ' I vo pi ose :i itioi I ( \ iti lesses to idc: i itify defei idai it as tl le si lootei I :H:I>< Cai i • :»il 
and Trevor Symes, had their testimony purchased by drastically reduced charges being brought 
against him in the ease ul ('arroll and no charges being brought against him in the case of Symes, 
rhey adn litted t< > the ise facts c >n tl le \ viti less sli u u 1 (R 1. 119-20, 209) 1 1 n ;< >i il> proseci ition 
witness without an overwhelming motive to fabricate because her testimony was not bargained 
3 
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foi IT; ' the State w as 1 01 1 Nelsoi 1 tl ic v ictii i i s gii Ifi iei id w ho was ji ist a few feet froi i 1 the si lootei 
She identified the shooter a few momen t s after the shooting whi le the mat ter was still fresh in her 
m i n d and her senses were still sharpened !•> \hc event as Hi spanu K I iliu The defendant is 
not I l ispai lie (R 1 215). 1 1 le pi oseci ltioi i ael ;:i IOW ledged 1 le is i: lot a i i iei i tbei of ai i;> i i hi ioi ity 
group (RT215) 
ri ;sc loregoing facts wei.- nu ,-;;i\ \iKi> p i ^ i u ^ ; r . i:ic prosecutioi l to idei itify the 
defendant and oile of them, the only credible fact, showed that defendant was not present . Even 
though on appeal the Court reviews the evidence in light most favorably to the prevai l ing party, 
]\ lit Biggs has i i lai shaled tl le evidei ice w 1 )ict i dei :i v :»i istrates ii ISI lfficiei it e \ idei ice of identity • 
Scudder v. Kennecott Cooper ('orp. 886 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1994). Consequently, defendant's 
conviction should be reversed because it is not supported by sufficient evidence, 
III. DEFENDANT DID BRING THE
 P R O S E C U T O R I A L CONDUCT TO THE 
COURT'S ATTENTION AND ASKED FOR A CURATIVE INSTRUCTION IN I 
TIMELY MANNER. 
The purpose of requiring objections at trial to preserve appellate issues is to hHng errors 
to tl le ti ial coi n t's attei itioi I so tl le ecu it t ai id opposii ig coi u lsel hav e a fail Dppoi ti in ii •••'<•"•' s s 
the objection, such as with a corrective admonit ion. State v. Hales 625 P.2d 1290 i 2(>2 (Utah 
1 ^ ::'..- >..aic a i g u c , in . j because the inai judge determined that no appropriate o r j eu ion was 
m a d e and that an objection was not m a d e in a t imely manner , defendant waived his prosecutor ia l 
misconduc t argument The record shows otherwise and the prosecutor in the case has 
acki lowledged in opei 1 coi ii t oi I a hearii ig oi I tl le stipi llatioi I tl lat tl le ;t i lattei vv as raised rhe 
prosecutor stated that he recalled the defense counsel calling for a sidebar conference where: 1) 
he notified the court that the prosecutor had referred to defendant as a "light skinned Mexican" 
4 
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A \ - 11:1 i till ie object! 1 thei e i\< as i 10 e\ idei ice to si lppoi t si ich at i assei tion; 2) he asked the coi u t to 
instruct the jury that the prosecutor's argument was not to be coi isidered as evidence; and 3) the 
court noted the objection (September 10, 1999 RT 5-6, attached in Appendix hereto) The matter 
was clearly raised before the cc i n: t ai id tl ie : : i n: 11 lad ai i lpk oppoi ti n lit) to con ect tl ie • zi i c r 
during instructions. 
The second ISSIK. IS W luiliu" the matter was raised iiI a timely manner, 1'he prosecutor 
n lade the staten ici it aboi it whei c he can ie fi oi i t, defei idai it v 'as ki low i l as a "Wedo" oi ligl it 
skinned Mexican near the end of Ins argument (II K ! ; ""; I wo pages later MI the transcript. 
imm-juiiii-j!\ .:!!-. !*tlie prosecuu : ;uai OH;C: : , . ; . A IUS argument, m*, deiensc asked loi ii.c s^!L-har 
where the issue was raised (II R l 380:1-41 ! he iury had not yet exited the cour t room and was 
given some insli ^ lions h\ 11K- * ourt, although n. M v one rcqucslctl I'TT R T "SO) The couri had 
before the j u r y left the cour t room but no curative instruction was made . 
Because the objection was made in a t imely manner and the court had ample oppor tuni ty 
t < . . , - • * -. , j v / l , u « , , ^ K . 
prosecutes ial nu^eonduc! argument un the merits. That argument demonstiates prejuuicial error. 
I I 11 h ( '<1 I  IK I ("AN SIMPI Y REVERSE THE GANG ENH 4.NCEMENT 
\> III III III I il \ REMAND 
The State concedes that the gang enhancement violated this Court's pronouncement in 
State v. Lopes9 980 P.2d 191 (t Jtah 1999), The State suggests that the mat ter be remanded for a 
jury trial on the issi ie Althoi igli nc >t n :t tin ? i c M lord, counsel notes I or the Coi irt 's benefit that the 
prosecutor has indicated he will I lot go forward on the gang enhancement . 
5 
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CONCU'SION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully requests that the guilty verdict and his 
sentence be reversed. 
J.-iO. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Samuel D. McVey 
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Page 3 1 
1 ( P R O C E E D I N G S ) 
2 THE COURT: state of Utah v. Jason Randy 
3 Biggs. I think we've had him transported; is that 
4 right? 
5 This is Case No. 98-1378. 
6 Mr. McVey, you are appearing on behalf of 
7 this Defendant? 
8 MR. MC VEY: I am, Your Honor? 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Esqueda, you are here for the 
10 State? 
11 MR. ESQUEDA: Yes, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: And, presumably, we have a Deputy 
13 Attorney General involved here, Miss Swatnick 
14 [phonetic], is she in the courtroom? 
15 MR. ESQUEDA: 1 don't believe so. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MR. ESQUEDA: I think we can probably--
18 THE COURT: Just muddle around without her. 
19 Are you Jason Randy Biggs? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Counsel, the reason that I have 
22 placed this on the calendar is because, as you both are 
23 aware, you have proposed by stipulation an amendment to 
24 or supplement to the record in this case. The 
25 supplement is as stated, I assume, in the documents you 
Page 4 
l have provided to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn, 
2 have been forwarded to me and signed by both of you, 
3 having to do with an alleged statement or direction of 
4 this Court at the conclusion of the State's argument in 
5 the trial. 
6 MR. MC VEY: That's correct, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right. I wanted for you, 
8 Mr. McVey, to state your position for the record, and 
9 then I'll entertain Mr. Esqueda's comments, and then I 
10 will decide whether I'm going to accede to the 
11 stipulation or not. 
12 Mr. McVey, you may proceed. 
13 MR. MC VEY: Your Honor, you are familiar 
14 with the statement that is in issue here. We think 
15 that that may raise an issue on appeal of whether a 
16 fact not in evidence may have been presented to the 
17 jury and that they can have an issue of whether it was 
18 prejudicial before the appellate court. But j 
19 immediately following the prosecutor's argument, rather 
20 than excuse the jury, we asked for a bench conference 
21 and asked the Court -- mentioned the statement to the 
22 Court and asked the Court for a curative instruction. 
23 And the Court indicated at that time that it would not 
24 give a curative instruction of that kind. And I 
25 believe that later the Court did tell the inrv th.it th^ 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Page 9 
1 acknowledge that it was at the conclusion of the 
2 State's rebuttal. And if, in deed, that was the 
3 timing, it would have been at the precise moment the 
4 jury is leaving the courtroom. But, anyway, I will 
5 notify you of my decision. 
6 MR. MC VEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
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Page 5 
1 standard instruction, that arguments of counsel are not 
2 evidence. But we just wanted to point out that we did 
3 raise that statement to the Court at the conclusion of 
4 the prosecutor's argument, and that's the only reason 
5 for the stipulation. 
6 THE COURT: And, Mr. McVey, I take it having 
7 now reviewed the transcript there is no record of this 
8 discussion that you are telling me about? 
9 MR. MC VEY: That's right, Your Honor. It 
10 just says that there was a bench conference. 
11 THE COURT: You are relying therefore upon 
12 your specific recollection? 
13 MR. MC VEY: That's correct, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McVey. 
15 MR. MCVEY: Thank you. 
\l6 THE COURT: And, by the way, I might indicate 
17 you are the one that initiated this proposed supplement 
18 to the record? 
19 MR. MC VEY: That's correct, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Esqueda, what's 
21 your position here? 
22 MR. ESQUEDA: I am not opposing the 
23 supplement to the record. The purpose - from my 
24 standpoint, I believe it was argument, it was 
25 acceptable argument that the Defendant raised in their 
Page 6 
1 closing argument a misidentification by one of the 
2 witnesses who said -- Mr. McVey raised this to the 
3 jury, that she identified a person as looking like a 
4 Mexican, and my response to that was in rebuttal to his 
5 argument. So I think it's entirely appropriate. 
6 My recollection is we did ask for a sidebar, 
7 that the Court granted that sidebar, we briefly 
8 discussed that issue and the objection, the Court noted 
9 the objection, in my recollection, and indicated that a 
10 curative instruction would be given at the close of our 
11 argument. And the Court did make that curative 
112 instruction, that the arguments of the attorneys are 
13 not considered as evidence. 
14 THE COURT: So the position you are taking, 
15 Mr. Esqueda, is that a curative instruction was given 
16 but that it was not at the precise moment requested, it 
17 was later in oral argument? 
18 MR. ESQUEDA: That's correct. It was given 
19 as an instruction to the Jury when instructions were 
20 read, that argument of counsel are not to be considered 
21 as evidence. That's my recollection, 
22 THE COURT: Counsel, I -- I'm going to take 
23 this decision under advisement. I will rule by minute 
24 entry ruling shortly. I do - and I think it is fair 
25 to tell you that I have certain reservations about 
Page 7 
1 this: First of all, the language being sought as a 
2 supplement is, in my estimation, not entirely complete 
3 to the extent that it provides somewhat of a 
4 mischaracterization of the statement made by 
5 Mr. Esqueda in the actual transcript. It is out of 
6 context, in other words; secondarily, I'm quite 
7 concerned about the timing of this, because the request 
8 for the sidebar, while it is alleged came after the 
9 State's initial argument to the jury, in deed, is 
10 reflected as having come at the conclusion of the 
11 State's rebuttal, which would be at the moment when the 
12 jury is exiting the courtroom. Consequently, I would 
13 not have indicated at that stage when the jury is 
14 leaving the courtroom that I would give a supplemental 
15 instruction, a curative instruction, unless one was 
16 presented to me in writing to present to the jury once 
17 they were deliberating. I have no specific 
18 recollection of the discussion, and it, though, seems 
19 to me to be out of keeping with what my procedure 
20 normally would have been. I 'm only too pleased to tell 
21 jurors that the statements of counsel are not evidence, 
22 and I tell them repeatedly through trials just so they 
23 are all clear on that. 
24 But having said that, I want to take a last 
25 look at the transcript, and then I will rule on this 
Page 8 
1 request to supplement the record and notify you by 
2 minute entry. 
3 MR. MC VEY: Thank you, Your Honor. If I 
4 could just address those two points you raised? 
5 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
6 MR. MC VEY: if we have taken it out of 
7 context, that will be clear in the record, and 
8 certainly that would be something that could be 
9 addressed on appeal. And then as to the timing, we 
10 waited until the conclusion of the argument simply as a 
11 matter of professional courtesy. Mr. Esqueda had 
12 obviously worked very hard on his argument and it was 
13 an excellent argument, and we didn't want to jump up 
14 and keep interrupting. But that's why we brought it up 
15 immediately at the conclusion. And the timeliness of 
16 it would also be something that the Attorney General 
17 could raise on appeal. 
18 THE COURT: Well, in that regard, the timing 
19 context, I think, is somewhat pertinent here because 
20 your motion refers to having approached the bench for 
21 the sidebar at the conclusion of the State's initial 
22 argument --
23 MR. MC VEY: I believe -
24 THE COURT: --1 believe - but, 
25 nevertheless, it appears to me now that you both 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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